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This paper presents an experimental analysis of the role of out-
comes and intentions for fair behavior. We consider a symmetric ver-
sion of the gift-exchange game in a 2x2 design with two treatment vari-
ables: intentionality (¯rst mover's choice is either intentional or ran-
domly determined) and outcome (¯rst mover's choice is either costly
or free, ie compensated by the experimenter). The four treatments
di®er with respect to the presence-absence of intentionality and cost
for the ¯rst mover, whereas the outcome of the ¯rst mover's action for
the second mover's payo® is kept constant across treatments. The re-
sults indicate that intentions do not matter for fair behavior, whereas
outcomes do matter. In particular, the e®ect of outcomes is due to
concerns for distributional fairness, whereas there is no evidence of an
intention-based role for outcomes through signalling kindness.
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Recent economic research has indicated that economic behavior in many cases
motivated by concerns for fairness. This evidence has led to the development
of theoretical models that incorporate fairness in agents' preferences (see
e.g. Fehr and Gachter, 2000, Sobel, 2004, and Fehr and Schmidt, 2006, for
recent surveys). Alternative theoretical approaches di®er with respect to
how fairness is de¯ned. In particular, two main classes of models can be
distinguished: models that focus on distributional concerns, and models that
focus on intention-based reciprocity.1
In the distributional approach, fairness refers to the distribution of mate-
rial payo®s. Economic agents are motivated not only by their own material
gain, but also by how their payo® compares with that of other agents. Fehr
and Schmidt (1999) assume that the utility of a subject depends on the dif-
ference between his own payo® and that of other subjects, so that agents
have egalitarian preferences. Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) assume that the
utility function of a subject depends on his own payo® relative to the average
overall payo®, so that agents care about their own relative status. In these
models, fairness-related preferences depend only on the ¯nal distribution of
payo®s, so that agents are not concerned about how a given distribution has
been obtained.
In the reciprocity approach, fairness refers to the intentions of other
agents. Agents derive utility from rewarding kind actions and punishing
unkind actions, even if this is costly in terms of material payo®s (e.g. Rabin,
1993; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004). Preferences depend on the per-
ceived kindness of an action and, therefore, on the beliefs about other agents'
intentions (why an agent has chosen a given action).2 In these models, actions
with identical outcomes may elicit di®erent reciprocating responses depend-
ing on how they are interpreted. A key question for intention-based reci-
procity models is therefore how agents evaluate the kindness of a particular
1In this paper we use the term reciprocity to refer to strong reciprocity, de¯ned as the
non-strategic conditional behavior to reward kind actions, and to punish unkind actions,
even if this is costly for the reciprocating subject.
2Both distribution and intentions play a role in the models by Charness and Rabin
(2002) and Falk and Fischbacher (2006). In particular, in the theory of reciprocity by Falk
and Fishbacher (2006) the kindness of an action depends on both intentionality and the
outcome of an action, where the latter is de¯ned as the di®erence in the payo®s of the
receiving and sending subjects.
2action.
At the empirical level, one way of assessing the kindness of an action
is to compare the action intentionally chosen with the alternative actions
that could have been chosen, thus focusing on the strategy space of the ¯rst
mover. Both intentionality, intended as free-will, and the set of alternative
possibilities therefore may contribute to de¯ne the perceived kindness of an
action. This implies two testable predictions. First, there should be no
intention-based reciprocal behavior when the action of the ¯rst mover is not
chosen intentionally, for example because it is the only available option or
it is determined exogenously, by a disinterested third party or by chance.
Second, the perceived kindness of an intentionally chosen action depends on
the characteristics of the alternative actions that were available to the agent
but were not chosen.
A ¯rst group of experimental studies has investigated the role of intention-
based fairness by focusing on the ¯rst prediction, testing the relevance of
¯rst mover's intentionality (the so-called attribution hypothesis). A control
treatment where the sender can intentionally choose what action to take
among a set of alternatives (thus signalling her intentions) is compared with
a treatment where the sender cannot choose, either because she does not
have alternative options, as in McCabe et al. (2003), or because her choice
is determined randomly, as in Blount (1995) and Falk et al. (2008). The
evidence, however, is mixed, and di®erent results are obtained for positive
and negative reciprocity.3 It is important to observe that the notion of inten-
tions investigated in this literature refers to the attribution of ¯rst mover's
intentionality (free will).
A second group of experimental studies investigates the role of fairness
intentions by focusing on the second testable prediction, testing the rele-
vance of the alternative actions available to the ¯rst mover for the perceived
kindness of a chosen action. In these studies, the strategy space of the ¯rst
3Bolton et al. (1998) study both positive and negative reciprocal behaviour, ¯nding
that distributional preferences are su±cient to explain observed reciprocal actions, whereas
intentions play a marginal role. Blount (1995) ¯nds signi¯cant evidence of attribution-
based behavior only for negative reciprocity (see also O®erman, 2002). Charness (2004)
compares a standard gift-exchange game to a treatment where the wage is determined
randomly, ¯nding that the slope of the relationship between wage and e®ort is signi¯cantly
higher when wages are chosen by the employer. This lends some support to the role of
intentions for positive reciprocity, although most of the reciprocal action can be attributed
to distribution. Falk et al. (2008) ¯nd that the attribution of fairness intentions has a
large and signi¯cant impact on both positive and negative reciprocal behavior.
3mover is manipulated in ways that are strategically irrelevant, but potentially
relevant for assessing the fairness of intentions (e.g. Andreoni et al., 2002,
Brandts and Solµ a, 2001, Falk et al., 2003). These studies generally indicate
that the perceived fairness of intentions is sensitive to alternative strategy
spaces. Bolton and Ockenfels (2005) provide evidence that both distribu-
tional factors (relative shares) and strategy spaces (available actions) matter
for fairness behavior. Bolton et. al. (2005) study experimentally the in-
°uence of procedural fairness on the pattern of acceptance and resistance
to di®erent outcomes, ¯nding that choice behavior is sensitive to procedu-
ral fairness. Overall, however, the evidence on the role of non-distributional
factors for models of social preferences is not conclusive. In particular, what
determines the perceived kindness of an action remains an open question.
In this paper we compare the role of outcomes and intentions for fair be-
havior by examining experimentally a symmetric version of the gift-exchange
game. While most experimental research has concentrated on either out-
comes or intentions, we propose an experimental design that allows to model
jointly the role of outcomes and intentions. The advantage of this design
is that it allows to disentangle the e®ect of outcomes through distributional
fairness, as in Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) and Fehr and Schmidt (1999),
from the e®ect of outcomes as a signal of kindness through intention-based
reciprocity, as in the models by Charness and Rabin (2002) and Falk and
Fischbacher (2006).
The results indicate that outcomes matter for fair behavior, whereas in-
tentions do not matter. In particular, the e®ect of outcomes is largely due
to distributional fairness, whereas the e®ect of outcomes through signalling
kind intentions, as in the model by Falk and Fischbacher (2006), plays a
marginal role. These ¯ndings are robust to alternative ways of measuring
fair behavior (in terms of amounts returned by second movers or correlations
between amounts sent and returned) and to alternative test procedures (be-
tween subjects or within subjects). Overall, the results provide an indication
that the role of intentions for fair behavior may have been overemphasized.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical
framework for the analysis. Section 3 describes the experimental design.
Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 concludes with a discussion of the
main ¯ndings and the implications of the analysis.
42 The Model
Following Falk and Fishbacher (2006), we present a framework to model the
e®ect of both outcomes and intentions on fair behavior. Consider agent i,
who is the second-mover in a one-shot sequential interaction with agent j.
The utility function of agent i is assumed to depend not only on material
payo®s (¼i), but also on concerns for fairness, represented by a distribu-
tion component and a reciprocity component. The distribution component
is expressed as the product of a distributional sensitivity parameter and a
distribution measure. The reciprocity component is given by the product of
a reciprocity parameter, a kindness term and a reciprocation term:
Ui (¼i;¼j) = ¼i + ®i±i + ½iÁi¾i (1)
The parameter ®i represents the agent's sensitivity to distributional factors.
The distribution parameter (±i) measures distributional fairness.4 The reci-
procity parameter (½i) represents the agent's sensitivity to reciprocity. The
kindness term (Ái) measures how kind the agent perceives the action under-
taken by the other agent. The reciprocation term (¾i) measures the e®ect of
the reciprocal action on the other agent's utility. Depending on the relative
size of the parameters ®i and ½i, and on the speci¯cation of ±i, Ái, and ¾i,
the distributional and intention-based reciprocity components may have a
di®erent relative weight in the agent's preferences.
Focusing on the reciprocity component, in Falk and Fishbacher (2006),
the kindness term depends on both the outcome and the intention underlying
the action one is responding to:
Ái = ¢i#i (2)
where the outcome term ¢i is de¯ned as the di®erence between the second
mover's payo® and the ¯rst mover's payo® (¼i¡¼j), and the intention factor
#i is a coe±cient between 0 and 1 that parametrizes the intentionality of the
action, with #i = 1 describing a fully intentional action and #i < 1 an action
not fully intentional.
4In Fehr and Schmidt (1999) the utility function depends negatively on the di®erence
between the agent's payo® and the payo® of the other agent. It is decreasing in the
absolute di®erence, but the rate of decrease is greater for unfavorable inequality than for
favorable inequality. In Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) the utility function, strictly concave
in the agent's share of total payo®s, depends negatively on the di®erence between the
agent's payo® and the average payo® of other agents.
5Note that, within this framework, the relevance of intentions can be as-
sessed by changing exogenously the parameter #, capturing the degree of
intentionality. If intentions matter, fair behavior should be elicited di®er-
ently depending on the value of #. The relevance of distributional outcomes
can be assessed by varying ±i. Note, however, that distributional outcomes
can also be used to interpret the intentions of the ¯rst mover. Therefore, a
change in the distribution of outcomes is also re°ected in ¢i. In our experi-
mental design we use both # and ¼j as treatment variables. This enables us
not only to identify and compare the e®ects of outcomes and intentions on
fairness, but also to disentangle the e®ects of outcomes through distributional
fairness (±) and through intention-based reciprocity (¢).
3 The Experiment
3.1 Experimental design
We examine experimentally a symmetric version of the gift-exchange game
(e.g. Fehr et al. 1993, Gachter and Falk, 2002) that consists of two stages. At
the beginning of the game, both players (A and B) are given an endowment
of 20 tokens. In the ¯rst stage, player A must choose the amount a (an
integer between 0 and 20) she wants to send to player B; the amount sent
is subtracted from the payo® of A, multiplied by 3 by the experimenter,
and added to the payo® of B. In the second stage, player B must choose
the amount (an integer between 0 and 20) she wants to send to player A;
the amount sent is subtracted from the payo® of B, multiplied by 3 by the
experimenter, and added to the payo® of A. Total payo®s are therefore 20 ¡
a+3b for player A and 20¡b+3a for player B. For each player the minimum
and maximum potential payo®s are 0 and 80 tokens, respectively.5
In stage 2, when players B have to make their choice, we apply the strategy
method (henceforth SM): player B has to provide a response for each feasible
action of player A, before being informed of the actual choice of A. This
allows us to study the responses to each possible action of A and therefore,
on the basis of responses to di®erent actions of A, to distinguish between
unconditional altruism and conditional altruism (positive reciprocity) in the
5Note that symmetry in the endowments eliminates the confounding e®ects of distri-
butional aspects, that may arise for example in a trust game: since both players have the
same endowment, inequality aversion cannot determine A's decision.
6strategies of B players.
We consider four treatments in a 2x2 between-within design. The ¯rst
treatment, used as a benchmark, is a standard direct reciprocity setting
(DIR), in which ¯rst movers' action is intentional and costly. To assess the
role of intentions, we consider a second treatment where it is common knowl-
edge for all subjects that A's choice is determined randomly by a computer.
In this treatment (NO-I) A's action is therefore costly but not intentional.
To assess the role of outcomes, we consider a third treatment where it is
common knowledge for all subjects that ¯rst movers will be compensated by
the experimenter for the amount sent, so that they will not bear any cost.
In this treatment (NO-C) ¯rst movers' action is therefore intentional but not
costly. We also consider a fourth treatment, where it is common knowledge
that ¯rst movers' choice is determined randomly and they will be compen-
sated by the experimenter for the amount sent. In this treatment (NO-CI)
¯rst movers' action is therefore neither intentional nor costly.
The four treatments therefore di®er with respect to the presence-absence
of either intentions or costs for the ¯rst mover, whereas the outcome of the
¯rst mover's action for the second mover's payo® is kept constant across
treatments. The role of intentions can be assessed by comparing treatments
1 and 2 or treatments 3 and 4. As for the role of outcomes on fair behaviour,
by comparing treatments 1 and 3 we can assess the e®ect through both
distributional fairness and intention-based reciprocity (outcomes signal kind
intentions). By comparing treatments 2 and 4 we can assess the pure e®ect
of outcomes through distributional fairness.
3.2 Hypotheses
The experiment is designed to address the following hypotheses:
1. Intentions matter for fair behavior: an action is perceived to be kind
depending on whether it is intentionally chosen by the ¯rst mover.
2. Outcomes matter for fair behavior: agents care for distributional fair-
ness, as they prefer more equitable outcomes irrespective of intentions.
Our operational de¯nition of fair behavior is based on two indicators.
First, the amount returned by B players, for any given amount received.
Second, the correlation coe±cient between the amounts sent by A and B.
7We focus on the Spearman coe±cient, than Pearson correlations, so as to
avoid restricting the attention to linear dependence.6 Nevertheless, in order
to enable a comparison of the two indicators, in presenting the results we
will also report Pearson correlation coe±cients.
De¯ning ¹i as the mean amount returned by B players or, alternatively,
as the correlation between amounts sent and returned for treatment i, we
test the following hypotheses:
1a. H0 : ¹1 = ¹2 vs Ha : ¹1 > ¹2 (intentions matter)
1b. H0 : ¹3 = ¹4 vs Ha : ¹3 > ¹4 (intentions matter in the absence of costs)
2a. H0 : ¹1 = ¹3 vs Ha : ¹1 > ¹3 (outcomes matter)
2b. H0 : ¹2 = ¹4 vs Ha : ¹2 > ¹4 (outcomes matter in the absence of
intentions)
3. H0 : ¹2 = ¹3 vs Ha : ¹2 6= ¹2 (outcomes vs intentions)
Note that the relevance of distributional outcomes is assessed by varying
the cost borne by the ¯rst mover. However, distributional outcomes can also
be used to interpret the intentions of the ¯rst mover. Therefore, a change
in the distribution of outcomes can also be re°ected in stronger perceived
kindness of an action. By comparing treatments 1 and 3 we can assess the
e®ect of outcomes on fair behaviour through both distributional fairness and
intention-based reciprocity (outcomes as a signal of kind intentions). By
comparing treatments 2 and 4 we can assess the pure e®ect of outcomes
through distributional fairness.
3.3 Procedures
We run four sessions, with 24 subjects participating in each session, for a
total of 96 subjects. In each of the four sessions, subjects were randomly
assigned to a computer terminal at their arrival. In order to ensure pub-
lic knowledge, instructions were distributed and read aloud (see Appendix
6Note that if, for example, reciprocity was motivated only by inequality aversion, this
could imply a linear relationship between b and a, so that Pearson correlations could be
used as an appropriate indicator of reciprocating behaviour. However, if reciprocity is
motivated also (or only) by the fairness of intentions, the relationship between b and a is
not necessarily linear, so that the Spearman correlation coe±cient is more appropriate.
81). Sample questions were distributed to ensure understanding of the ex-
perimental procedures. Answers were privately checked and, if necessary,
explained to the subjects, and the experiment did not start until all subjects
had answered all questions correctly.
In each session each subject played one phase for each of the four treat-
ments, in the role of either A or B, for a total of 8 phases.7 In each phase,
subjects were assigned to their role as player A or B. A stranger matching
mechanism was used to avoid strategic behavior. In addition, there was no
information feedback after each phase, to avoid cross-subject dependence.
Subjects therefore played 8 independent one-shot games. Only at the end of
the 8 phases, one phase was selected randomly to determine payments and
each subject was informed of her payo® in tokens and in euros.
The experiment was conducted in the Experimental Economics Labora-
tory of the University of Milan Bicocca in November 2008. Participants were
undergraduate students of Economics recruited by e-mail using a list of vol-
untary potential candidates. Sessions lasted approximately 55 minutes. No
show-up fee was paid and the exchange rate was 3 tokens = 1 euro. The aver-
age payment was 11.6 euros. The experiment was run using the experimental
software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
4 Results
Table 1 and ¯gures 1-2 report mean and median amount sent and returned
for each treatment. The average amount sent by A players is 6.4 tokens in
the DIR-treatment and 15.5 in the NO-C treatment, as opposed to 10 euros
in treatments NO-I and NO-CI, where it is drawn randomly from a uniform
distribution between 0 and 21. Average responses by players B are relatively
similar in the DIR and NO-I treatments (5.23 and 5.53, respectively). They
are also similar, but smaller, in the NO-C and NO-CI treatments (4.07 and
3.8, respectively). A similar pattern applies to returned amounts by individ-
ual input (from 0 to 21), although the di®erences between the treatments
are more marked as the amount sent by the ¯rst mover rises. This pattern is
shown clearly in ¯gures 3 and 4, where mean and median amounts returned
by second movers are displayed for each possible amount received. Both ¯g-
7The sequence of treatments was 1-2-3-4 in session 1, 2-1-4-3 in session 2, 3-4-1-2 in
session 3, and 4-3-2-1 in session 4. The same sequence was used for each player in role A
and B.
9ures indicate that the pro¯les for the four treatments are relatively similar up
to a received amount of about 5 tokens, whereas the diverge thereafter, with
the averages for the two treatments in which the ¯rst movers are not com-
pensated (DIR and NO-I) remaining well above the two treatments where
the ¯rst movers are compensated (NO-C and NO-CI).
Tables 2 and 3 report test results for the hypothesis that median amounts
returned by second movers are the same between pairs of treatments, both
overall and by individual amount sent by ¯rst movers. In particular, table 2
reports results of rank-sum tests carried out between subjects, while table 3
reports results of sign-rank tests carried out within subjects. In both cases,
tests are based on 96 independent observations.
The results for the tests between subjects (table 2) indicate that inten-
tions do not matter: median returned amounts are not statistically di®erent
when ¯rst movers' intentionality is removed, both in the presence of costs for
the ¯rst mover (comparing treatments DIR and NO-I, column 1) and in the
absence of costs for the ¯rst mover (comparing treatments NO-C and NO-
CI, column 6). On the contrary, outcomes do matter: di®erences in median
returned amounts are strongly statistically signi¯cant when ¯rst movers are
compensated, both in the presence of intentions for the ¯rst mover (compar-
ing treatments DIR and NO-C, column 2) and in the absence intentions for
the ¯rst mover (comparing treatments NO-I and NO-CI, column 5). Indeed,
this latter result indicates that the concern for distributional fairness alone is
su±cient to explain the role of outcomes. These results apply both to results
over all possible amounts received (rows 1-2), and to results for individual
amounts received, with the exception of low input levels (below 5 tokens).
The results for the tests within subjects (table 3) are more clear-cut in
providing the same indications: intentions do not matter, whereas outcomes
matter. The reason why outcomes matter is that agents appear to be con-
cerned by distributional fairness, whereas outcomes are not used to interpret
the perceived kindness of an action.
Result 1: Intentions do not matter for fair behavior: amounts re-
turned by second movers are not a®ected by whether ¯rst movers
actions are intentional.
Result 2: Outcomes matter for fair behavior: amounts returned
by second movers are signi¯cantly a®ected by whether ¯rst movers
actions are costly.
10Table 4 reports, for each treatment, average correlation coe±cients be-
tween amounts sent and returned, with the corresponding p-values for the
null hypothesis of zero correlation. Averages are calculated over 96 individ-
ual correlation coe±cients based on 21 observations. Spearman correlation
is highest in DIR (0.4), and gradually diminishing in NO-I (0.36), NO-C
(0.31) and NO-CI (0.27). A qualitatively similar pattern applies to Pearson
correlation coe±cients. Tables 5 reports results of rank-sum tests carried out
between subjects for the hypothesis that median individual correlations are
the same between pairs of treatments. The results indicate that di®erences in
median correlations are not statistically signi¯cant when intentions are ma-
nipulated (DIR vs NO-I and NO-C vs NO-CI), whereas they are marginally
signi¯cant when ¯rst movers' costs are varied (DIR vs NO-C and NO-I vs
NO-CI). The results for sign-rank tests carried out within subjects, reported
in table 6, are instead much more clear-cut: outcomes matter, whereas in-
tentions do not matter.
Result 3: Intentions do not matter for fair behavior: correla-
tions between amounts sent by ¯rst movers and returned by sec-
ond movers are not a®ected by whether ¯rst movers actions are
intentional.
Result 4: Outcomes matter for fair behavior: correlations be-
tween amounts sent by ¯rst movers and returned by second movers
are signi¯cantly a®ected by whether ¯rst movers actions are costly.
5 Conclusions
This paper compared the role of distributional outcomes and intentions for
fair behavior. We proposed a design that allows not only to identify and
compare the e®ects of outcomes and intentions on fair behavior, but also
to disentangle the e®ect of outcomes through distributional fairness, as in
Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) and Fehr and Schmidt (1999), from the e®ect
of outcomes as a signal of kindness through intention-based reciprocity, as in
the models by Charness and Rabin (2002) and Falk and Fischbacher (2006).
We proposed a new experimental design with two treatment variables: ¯rst
movers' intentionality and cost. The analysis was based on two alternative
11ways of measuring fair behavior (amounts returned by second movers or cor-
relations between amounts sent and returned) and test procedures between
subjects and within subjects.
The experimental analysis provided two main results. First, intentions
do not matter. This ¯nding is at odds with the results in many related
experimental investigations (e.g. Nelson, 2002, Sutter, 2007). Indeed, second
movers tend to return higher amounts in the treatments where intentions are
absent. One possible interpretation of this seemingly counter-intuitive result
is that intention-based reciprocity also depends on the motivation driving an
action (see Stanca et al., 2008): an action driven by a strategic motivation
can be perceived as less kind than an action not drive by strategic motives.
Second, outcomes do matter for fair behavior. In particular, the e®ect of
outcomes is largely due to concerns for distributional fairness, whereas the
e®ect of outcomes through signalling kind intentions, as in the model by Falk
and Fischbacher (2006), plays a marginal role. Overall, the results provide
an indication that the role of intentions for fair behavior may have been
overemphasized.
126 Appendix: Instructions
This appendix reports the instructions distributed on paper to the subjects.
Paragraph headings indicate in brackets if the given subsection is common
to both treatments or is speci¯c to the relevant treatment.
Instructions [common to all treatments]
² Welcome and thanks for participating in this experiment.
² During the experiment you are not allowed to talk or communicate in
any way with other participants. If at any time you have any questions
raise your hand and one of the assistants will come to you to answer it.
² By following the instructions carefully you can earn an amount of
money that will depend on your choices and the choices of other par-
ticipants.
² At the end of the experiment the tokens that you have earned will
be converted in euros at the exchange rate 2 tokens = 1 euro. The
resulting amount will be paid to you in cash.
General rules [common to all treatments]
² There are 24 subjects participating in this experiment.
² The experiment takes place in 8 independent phases. Instructions for
each phases will appear on the screen.
² In each phase 12 couples of two participants will be formed randomly
and anonymously, so that in each phase you will interact with a di®erent
subject.
² Within each couple, the two subjects will be randomly assigned two
di®erent roles: A and B.
² Therefore, in each phase each subject will interact exclusively with the
other subject in her pair, without knowing her/her identity, with the
role (A or B) assigned with equal probability.
13² The choices that you and the other subject will make in each and
the corresponding outcomes will be communicated at the end of the
experiment.
² At the end of the experiment only one of the 8 phases will be selected
randomly and earnings for each participant will be determined on the
basis of the selected phase.
How players interact
² Both A and B will receive an endowment of 20 tokens each.
² Player A will have to decide how many tokens (between 0 and 20) to
send to player B. [DIR only]
² A number of tokens of A between 0 and 20 will be sent to player B. The
number of tokens sent will be determined randomly by the computer,
so that player A will make no choice. [NO-I, NO-CI only]
² Player A will fully be reimbursed by the experimenter for the amount
sent to player B, so that player A will bear no cost. [NO-C , NO-CI
only]
² We will triple the amount sent, so that B will receive 3 tokens for each
token sent by A.
² Therefore:
{ A will obtain 20 tokens minus the tokens sent to B; [DIR, NO-I]
{ A will obtain 20 tokens; [NO-C , NO-CI]
{ B will obtain 20 tokens plus 3 times the tokens sent by A.
² Subject B will have to decide how many tokens (between 0 and 20) to
send to player A.
² We will triple the amount sent, so that A will receive 3 tokens for each
token sent by B.
² Therefore, in total:
14{ A will obtain 20 tokens minus the tokens sent to B in phase 1 plus
3 times the tokens sent by B in phase 2.
{ A will obtain 20 tokens plus 3 times the tokens sent by B in phase
2. [NO-C , NO-CI]
{ B will obtain 20 tokens plus 3 times the tokens sent by A in phase
1 minus the tokens sent to A in phase 2.
{ B will obtain 20 tokens plus 3 times the tokens of A sent by the
computer in phase 1 minus the tokens sent to A in phase 2. [NO-I
, NO-CI]
² The choice of how many tokens B wants to send to A will be made
as follows: before being informed of how many tokens A sent to B in
phase 1, B has to decide how many tokens she wants to send to A for
each of the possible amounts that A could have sent to him (0;1;:::;20
tokens). Since there are 21 possible cases, B has to make 21 choices.
² After B players have made their choice, only the one corresponding to
the actual decision of A will be used to determine the earnings.
² The phase will end and total earnings for each subject for this phase
will be determined as the sum of the earnings obtained in phase 1 and
in phase 2.
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18Table 1: Mean and median amounts sent and returned, by treatment
Means Medians
DIR NO-I NO-C NO-CI DIR NO-I NO-C NO-CI
Subject A 6.42 9.98 15.51 9.98 5.00 10.00 20.00 10.50
Subject B - SM all 5.23 5.53 4.07 3.87 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
Subject B - SM 0 1.84 2.30 1.76 1.99 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Subject B - SM 1 2.51 2.98 2.11 2.26 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Subject B - SM 2 2.60 3.25 2.56 2.49 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00
Subject B - SM 3 3.00 3.73 2.73 2.71 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
Subject B - SM 4 3.43 4.05 3.22 3.10 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
Subject B - SM 5 3.91 4.45 3.36 3.23 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
Subject B - SM 6 4.34 4.99 3.80 3.48 1.00 2.00 0.00 0.00
Subject B - SM 7 4.66 5.33 3.97 3.59 1.50 3.00 0.00 0.00
Subject B - SM 8 4.97 5.74 3.98 3.66 2.00 3.00 0.00 0.00
Subject B - SM 9 5.30 5.91 4.05 3.81 2.50 3.00 0.00 0.00
Subject B - SM 10 5.52 6.11 3.98 4.06 2.50 3.00 0.00 0.00
Subject B - SM 11 5.38 6.19 4.27 3.86 2.00 3.00 0.00 0.00
Subject B - SM 12 5.76 6.28 4.29 4.05 2.00 3.00 0.50 0.00
Subject B - SM 13 6.14 6.35 4.92 4.52 3.00 4.00 0.50 0.00
Subject B - SM 14 6.49 6.34 5.00 4.54 3.00 4.00 0.50 0.00
Subject B - SM 15 6.77 6.68 5.08 4.72 2.50 5.00 0.00 0.00
Subject B - SM 16 7.05 6.55 4.89 4.72 4.00 2.50 0.00 0.00
Subject B - SM 17 7.24 6.98 4.92 4.94 3.00 5.00 0.50 0.00
Subject B - SM 18 7.52 6.99 5.14 5.08 4.00 3.50 1.00 0.00
Subject B - SM 19 7.26 7.19 5.24 5.25 2.00 5.00 1.00 0.50
Subject B - SM 20 8.09 7.67 6.24 5.22 4.50 5.50 1.50 0.00
Note: Means and median amounts are calculated over 96 independent observations.
19Table 2: Tests of di®erences in amounts returned (between subjects)
DIR NO-I DIR NO-C DIR NO-CI NO-I NO-C NO-I NO-CI NO-C NO-CI
Overall -1.43 5.34 6.64 6.81 8.06 1.35
(p-value) 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.18
By input (p-value)
SM 0 0.66 0.90 0.85 0.75 0.81 0.94
SM 1 0.64 0.25 0.27 0.12 0.14 0.95
SM 2 0.34 0.46 0.28 0.11 0.06 0.79
SM 3 0.30 0.58 0.39 0.12 0.07 0.78
SM 4 0.46 0.60 0.40 0.24 0.13 0.76
SM 5 0.63 0.34 0.18 0.17 0.08 0.68
SM 6 0.51 0.33 0.16 0.12 0.05 0.69
SM 7 0.49 0.26 0.11 0.09 0.03 0.64
SM 8 0.49 0.20 0.10 0.06 0.02 0.71
SM 9 0.70 0.15 0.08 0.08 0.04 0.79
SM 10 0.70 0.09 0.10 0.04 0.05 0.99
SM 11 0.52 0.21 0.11 0.06 0.03 0.73
SM 12 0.73 0.14 0.08 0.07 0.04 0.75
SM 13 0.90 0.18 0.08 0.13 0.06 0.70
SM 14 0.95 0.15 0.07 0.15 0.07 0.69
SM 15 0.91 0.14 0.08 0.09 0.05 0.79
SM 16 0.70 0.05 0.04 0.12 0.09 0.90
SM 17 0.93 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.91
SM 18 0.67 0.06 0.03 0.12 0.07 0.77
SM 19 0.97 0.14 0.12 0.12 0.10 0.88
SM 20 0.67 0.23 0.03 0.39 0.06 0.27
Note: The table reports rank-sum tests between subjects, and corresponding p-values,
for a two-sided null hypothesis of equal median between treatments. Results in rows 1-2
are based on the 21 possible amounts sent by A. All tests are based on 96 independent
observations.
20Table 3: Tests of di®erences in amount returned (within subjects)
DIR NO-I DIR NO-C DIR NO-CI NO-I NO-C NO-I NO-CI NO-C NO-CI
Overall -1.43 5.34 6.64 6.81 8.06 1.35
(p-value) 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.18
By input (p-value)
SM 0 0.66 0.90 0.85 0.75 0.81 0.94
SM 1 0.64 0.25 0.27 0.12 0.14 0.95
SM 2 0.34 0.46 0.28 0.11 0.06 0.79
SM 3 0.30 0.58 0.39 0.12 0.07 0.78
SM 4 0.46 0.60 0.40 0.24 0.13 0.76
SM 5 0.63 0.34 0.18 0.17 0.08 0.68
SM 6 0.51 0.33 0.16 0.12 0.05 0.69
SM 7 0.49 0.26 0.11 0.09 0.03 0.64
SM 8 0.49 0.20 0.10 0.06 0.02 0.71
SM 9 0.70 0.15 0.08 0.08 0.04 0.79
SM 10 0.70 0.09 0.10 0.04 0.05 0.99
SM 11 0.52 0.21 0.11 0.06 0.03 0.73
SM 12 0.73 0.14 0.08 0.07 0.04 0.75
SM 13 0.90 0.18 0.08 0.13 0.06 0.70
SM 14 0.95 0.15 0.07 0.15 0.07 0.69
SM 15 0.91 0.14 0.08 0.09 0.05 0.79
SM 16 0.70 0.05 0.04 0.12 0.09 0.90
SM 17 0.93 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.91
SM 18 0.67 0.06 0.03 0.12 0.07 0.77
SM 19 0.97 0.14 0.12 0.12 0.10 0.88
SM 20 0.67 0.23 0.03 0.39 0.06 0.27
Note: The table reports sign-rank tests within subjects, and corresponding p-values, for
a two-sided null hypothesis of equal median between treatments. Results in rows 1-2 are
based on the 21 possible amounts sent by A. All tests are based on 96 independent
observations.
21Table 4: Average correlations, within treatments
DIR NO-I NO-C NO-CI
Spearman correlation 0.40 0.36 0.31 0.27
P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Pearson correlation 0.39 0.35 0.31 0.26
P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Note: Averages are calculated for 96 individual correlation coe±cients, each calculated
over 21 observations.
Table 5: Tests of di®erences in correlations (between subjects)
DIR NO-I DIR NO-C DIR NO-CI NO-I NO-C NO-I NO-CI NO-C NO-CI
Spearman
U-test 0.57 1.49 2.20 0.89 1.54 0.72
P-value 0.57 0.14 0.03 0.37 0.12 0.47
Pearson
U-test 0.58 1.40 2.29 0.80 1.61 0.91
P-value 0.56 0.16 0.02 0.42 0.11 0.37
Note: The table reports rank-sum tests between subjects, and corresponding p-values,
for a two-sided null hypothesis of equal median between treatments. All tests are based
on 96 independent observations.
Table 6: Tests of di®erences in correlations (within subjects)
DIR NO-I DIR NO-C DIR NO-CI NO-I NO-C NO-I NO-CI NO-C NO-CI
Spearman
U-test 1.00 2.37 3.15 1.38 2.82 1.31
P-value 0.31 0.02 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.19
Pearson
U-test 0.09 1.84 3.10 1.12 2.38 0.63
P-value 0.93 0.07 0.00 0.26 0.02 0.53
Note: The table reports sign-rank tests within subjects, and corresponding p-values, for
a two-sided null hypothesis of equal median between treatments. All tests are based on
96 independent observations.
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